U.S. military modernization depends on secure access to specific materials that support advanced radar, communications, and electronic warfare systems. Yttrium is one of these materials. When refined into yttrium iron garnet, commonly known as YIG, it enables low-loss magnetic performance and frequency stability in high-frequency microwave components essential to sensing and electromagnetic operations.[1] According to U.S. Geological Survey assessments, the United States is fully import reliant for yttrium, and approximately ninety-three percent of U.S. yttrium compound consumption between 2020 and 2023 was supplied by material processed in China.[2][3] Most imported yttrium metal and compounds originate from mineral concentrates refined there, reflecting China’s dominance in processing capacity. This dependence introduces uncertainty into development timelines, production planning, and long-term sustainment. It slows how quickly the United States may test, refine, scale, and sustain advanced systems and therefore influences how the United States develops and applies military power.

This analysis examines how foreign dependence on critical minerals, particularly Chinese-processed yttrium, shapes the pace and direction of U.S. military innovation today and in the future. The central claim is that critical mineral dependence slows innovation by increasing uncertainty in prototyping, iteration, scaling, and sustainment. Insights from Posen, Rosen, Kahl and Mitre, and Milley and Schmidt show that militaries innovate most effectively when inputs are predictable, specialist communities are stable, iteration is rapid, and the industrial base aligns with strategic demands.[5][6][7][8] Chinese dominance in yttrium processing weakens these conditions, giving material chokepoints direct strategic significance.

I. Future Warfare and the Role of Critical Minerals

Future warfare depends heavily on systems that sense, communicate, target, and process information at high speed and with high accuracy. Radar, secure communications, electronic warfare receivers, and autonomous platforms rely on hardware built from materials that remain stable under heat, stress, and rapid operation. Critical minerals support these functions. Rare earth elements, semiconductor materials, and specialized magnetic crystals provide strong magnetic performance, signal stability, structural resilience, and efficient power use.

Yttrium iron garnet fits directly within this foundation. Public technical literature describes YIG as a low-loss magnetic material used in high-frequency filters, oscillators, circulators, and related microwave components where frequency selectivity and signal stability are required.[1] In practical terms, YIG supports stable tuning, narrowband filtering, and low signal attenuation across wide frequency ranges in radar and receiver subsystems. These characteristics are particularly important in electromagnetic environments where precision, stability, and resistance to interference are critical. YIG is therefore a niche material with outsized importance in selected high-frequency applications.

U.S. Geological Survey assessments show that consumers of yttrium compounds and metals in the United States are fully dependent on imports and that most of those imports are derived from material processed in China.[2][3] Comparable patterns of import reliance and foreign processing dominance exist for other minerals used in magnets, power electronics, and semiconductor components, including selected rare earth elements as well as gallium and germanium.[3] China has previously restricted exports of rare earth elements and has implemented licensing requirements for gallium and germanium. These measures are documented in public legal and policy analyses and demonstrate that supply chokepoints are real and that dominant producers may use them for economic or political leverage.[9][10] Although yttrium has not been the focus of similarly visible restrictions, it is processed within the same industrial ecosystem, and the potential for influence remains.

The 2025 National Security Strategy identifies these issues directly. It links national security to economic strength, technological leadership, and resilient supply chains and states that the United States must not be dependent on outside powers for core components needed for national defense or the functioning of the economy.[4] It calls for secure access to critical minerals, resilient industrial capacity, and deeper cooperation with allies and partners.[4] In this context, materials are not a peripheral industrial concern. They help determine which technologies may be fielded, scaled, and sustained at meaningful levels.

II. Why Materials Matter for Organizations and Innovation

Several influential scholars of military innovation explain why supply stability affects modernization, even though they do not write about minerals directly.

Barry Posen argues that militaries prefer predictable tools and predictable plans. Large organizations tend to resist innovations that introduce operational or logistical uncertainty and favor doctrines and systems whose performance and sustainment may be forecast with reasonable confidence.[5] When key inputs are fragile or unreliable, organizations become more reluctant to adopt systems that depend on them.

Stephen Rosen argues that major innovation requires new specialist communities inside the military.[6] These communities consist of officers and technical experts who build careers around new ways of fighting and whose advancement signals institutional commitment. They depend on predictable program funding and material support. If a technology relies on an input that might be cut off or severely constrained, it becomes harder for such communities to form and persist.

Colin Kahl and Jim Mitre argue that strategic competition increasingly hinges on rapid iteration.[7] Advantage flows not only from breakthrough inventions but from the speed with which militaries test, refine, and scale new systems across the force. Anything that slows experimentation or diffusion affects strategic tempo.

Mark Milley and Eric Schmidt argue that the American industrial base is not aligned with the demands of future conflict.[8] They highlight recent shortfalls in producing relatively simple munitions at scale and warn that scaling complex systems will be even more challenging. If essential components rely on imported materials whose processing is concentrated abroad, industrial expansion alone may not resolve vulnerability.

Together, these perspectives show why dependable access to materials matters for innovation. When inputs are uncertain, adoption slows, specialist communities struggle to form, iteration lengthens, and industrial capacity remains fragile. These dynamics directly constrain modernization.

III. How Material Dependence Constrains Military Innovation

Material dependence affects innovation at multiple stages of the technology life cycle. These mechanisms follow from established features of defense acquisition and supply chain behavior rather than from a single dataset.

Prototyping slows when programs rely on materials with long lead times or uncertain availability. Program managers may hesitate to design early models around such materials, and limited access reduces the number of prototypes that may be built and tested within a given budget window.

Iteration cycles lengthen under similar conditions. Effective innovation requires repeated rounds of building, testing, and learning. When specialized components take significant time to procure, each round of iteration takes longer, reducing opportunities to refine performance and reliability. This aligns with Kahl and Mitre’s emphasis on rapid experimentation and diffusion as sources of advantage.[7]

Scaling becomes more difficult when future supply is uncertain. Acquisition planners must commit to systems years before full production. If stable access to essential materials cannot be assured, promising systems may advance more slowly or be approved at smaller scale than would otherwise be optimal.

Sustainment becomes fragile when long-term maintenance depends on materials processed abroad. Advanced radar, communications, and electronic warfare systems require spare parts over decades. If core components rely on foreign processing, sustainment planning must account for risks outside U.S. control.

Organizational culture reflects these realities. Systems built on fragile supply chains may be viewed as less dependable than those built from stable inputs. Senior leaders may favor alternatives offering lower peak performance but greater logistical reliability, echoing Posen’s argument about organizational preferences for predictability.[5]

These mechanisms apply directly to YIG-dependent systems. YIG contributes to frequency stability, filter selectivity, and low-loss signal handling in microwave subsystems.[1] If YIG components face supply constraints, the systems that rely on them face elevated operational and programmatic risk. Public sources do not always document specific delays linked to individual minerals, but the combination of known dependencies and acquisition structures makes such bottlenecks likely.[2][3]

IV. Strategic Competition and the Future of Warfare

The United States is engaged in long-term strategic competition shaped by sensing, targeting, communications, and electronic warfare. Kahl and Mitre describe this environment as one in which states compete through the speed and scale at which they adopt and refine complex systems, including artificial-intelligence-enabled architectures, networks, and advanced sensing platforms.[7] Material chokepoints slow this process. They shorten planning horizons, increase caution, and lead decision makers to delay or limit investment in promising capabilities. States with secure access to key materials may move faster and shape operational norms and expectations.

Milley and Schmidt emphasize that industrial capacity must match operational demands if the United States is to be ready for future wars.[8] If essential components depend on materials processed abroad, production lines may not surge when needed. States that control upstream processing gain structural advantages. They may influence competitor timelines through export policies or administrative practices and shape expectations without resorting to overt sanctions or military pressure. Historical export controls on rare earths and licensing requirements for gallium and germanium illustrate how such tools may be used.[9][10]

This pattern does not imply that China is likely to restrict yttrium exports. It means that dominance in processing creates influence over costs, timelines, and planning assumptions if geopolitical tensions rise. In a competitive environment, that influence matters even if it is never fully exercised.

V. Counterarguments and Rebuttal

Several arguments suggest that material constraints may be less central than this analysis implies. One view, grounded in Posen and Rosen, holds that doctrine, civil-military relations, and bureaucratic politics matter more than material inputs in shaping innovation.[5][6] If leaders prioritize change, they may push through constraints, and technology adoption may reflect elite preferences and institutional bargaining more than resource conditions.

Another view, rooted in nuclear deterrence theory, holds that nuclear weapons reduce the strategic importance of conventional imbalances. Kenneth Waltz argues that nuclear deterrence makes major power war highly unlikely and allows states to tolerate certain conventional disadvantages.[11] John Mueller similarly suggests that war among major powers has become increasingly rare and that nuclear weapons contribute to this trend.[12] If accepted, these arguments imply that constraints on conventional innovation may have limited strategic consequences.

These perspectives highlight important dimensions of strategy but do not eliminate the relevance of material constraints. Doctrine requires physical systems to implement it. Concepts such as electromagnetic maneuver, distributed sensing, and resilient communications depend on hardware supported by critical minerals. Nuclear stability also does not remove the importance of conventional capabilities. States continue to compete below the nuclear threshold in intelligence collection, surveillance, targeting, electronic warfare, and cyber operations. These activities depend on mineral-intensive systems and influence crisis signaling, escalation management, and the credibility of extended deterrence.

VI. National Security Strategy and Material Resilience

The 2025 National Security Strategy links U.S. national security to economic strength, technological leadership, and resilient supply chains.[4] It emphasizes reindustrialization, revitalization of the defense industrial base, and secure access to critical materials. It warns that the United States must not be dependent on outside powers for core components necessary for national defense or the functioning of the economy and calls for expanded access to critical minerals and deeper cooperation with allies and partners.[4]

These priorities align with the theoretical insights discussed earlier. The emphasis on scaling and diffusion parallels Kahl and Mitre’s focus on iteration advantage.[7] The call for sustained production and surge capacity reflects Milley and Schmidt’s argument about industrial alignment.[8] The focus on reducing vulnerability and uncertainty resonates with Posen’s and Rosen’s emphasis on predictability as a precondition for organizational adaptation.[5][6]

Yttrium provides a concrete example of the vulnerabilities highlighted in the strategy. Full import reliance, concentration of processing in a strategic competitor, and importance to high-frequency electromagnetic systems capture many of the risks the document identifies. Addressing such vulnerabilities is therefore a core requirement for implementing the broader strategic vision.

VII. Policy Implications

If critical mineral dependence shapes the pace and scale of U.S. military innovation, policy responses must address organizational behavior, industrial structure, and alliance relationships.

On the organizational side, militaries may adjust education, training, and career management to build specialist communities that understand both electromagnetic systems and supply chain risk. This may include expanded training pipelines in sensing, communications, and electronic warfare, dedicated communities of practice for mineral-intensive systems, and systematic integration of these systems into exercises and wargames.

On the industrial side, policy options include expanding domestic and allied refining, processing, and recycling capacity where feasible; supporting research into substitute materials and designs that reduce reliance on constrained inputs; incorporating mineral risk assessments into acquisition processes; and aligning industrial investment strategies with realistic supply assumptions.

Allied cooperation represents a third pillar. Developing processing partnerships with trusted allies, investing jointly in extraction and recycling infrastructure, and integrating critical mineral strategy into broader defense industrial cooperation may distribute risk more effectively. This approach aligns with the National Security Strategy’s emphasis on resilient supply chains built with allies rather than reliance on single-country suppliers.[4]

VIII. Conclusion

Military innovation depends on predictable inputs, organizational adaptation, and industrial capacity. Critical minerals underpin advanced sensing, communications, and electronic warfare systems central to future warfare. Yttrium, refined into yttrium iron garnet, plays an important role in selected high-frequency components, yet the United States is fully import reliant and depends heavily on material processed in China.[1][2][3] This dependence introduces uncertainty that slows prototyping, lengthens iteration cycles, constrains scaling, and complicates long-term sustainment. It also gives processing states potential structural influence through their impact on costs, timelines, and planning assumptions.[9][10]

Theoretical perspectives from Posen, Rosen, Kahl and Mitre, and Milley and Schmidt all emphasize the importance of predictability, iteration, and industrial alignment.[5][6][7][8] Nuclear-focused arguments from Waltz and Mueller highlight other dimensions of stability but do not remove the need for robust conventional capabilities in sensing and electromagnetic operations.[11][12] The 2025 National Security Strategy explicitly recognizes critical mineral vulnerabilities and links them to long-term competitiveness and military advantage.[4] Strengthening material resilience through organizational reform, industrial investment, and allied cooperation will be essential if the United States is to sustain a high tempo of innovation and maintain credible military power in an era of rapid technological change and intensifying strategic competition.

Works Cited

[1] Heeger Materials. “Yttrium Iron Garnet (YIG) Is a High-Performance Magnetic Material Widely Used in Advanced Microwave and Optical Applications.” Technical datasheet, accessed 2025.

[2] U.S. Geological Survey. “Yttrium.” In Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025. Reston, VA: U.S. Department of the Interior, 2025.

[3] U.S. Geological Survey. “Minerals with Net Import Reliance on China.” Fact sheet, 2025.

[4] The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: The White House, November 2025.

[5] Barry R. Posen. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984.

[6] Stephen Peter Rosen. “New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation.” International Security 13, no. 1 (Summer 1988): 134–168.

[7] Colin H. Kahl and Jim Mitre. “The Real AI Race: America Needs More Than Innovation to Compete With China.” Foreign Affairs, July 9, 2025.

[8] Mark A. Milley and Eric Schmidt. “America Is Not Ready for the Wars of the Future.” Foreign Affairs 103, no. 5 (September–October 2024).

[9] FTI Consulting. “China’s Export Controls on Critical Minerals: Gallium, Germanium, and Graphite.” Industry and policy analysis, 2023.

[10] Observer Research Foundation America. “China’s Critical Mineral Export Controls.” Policy brief, 2023.

[11] Kenneth N. Waltz. “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities.” American Political Science Review 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 731–745.

[12] John Mueller. “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World.” International Security 13, no. 2 (Fall 1988): 55–79.